On 16 April 2025, I was charged with “obstructing police” under s. 790 of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act (Qld). But serious legal questions arise:
⚖️ 1. Were police acting lawfully?
Police can only charge obstruction if they were lawfully performing duties. Here, they were assisting Biosecurity Officers whose own actions were not properly authorised under the Biosecurity Act 2014 (Qld). (Plenty v Dillon; Lewis v Cox).
⚖️ 2. Did police bypass Parliament’s intended safeguards?
The PPRA provides a clear scheme (ss. 18 & 791): officers must ask if there’s a reasonable excuse before issuing a direction. That never happened.
⚖️ 3. Was community involvement ignored?
Section 12 of the Biosecurity Act requires the program to be administered with genuine consultation. No consultation or consideration occurred.
⚖️ 4. Was my reasonable excuse valid?
The Act (s. 238, s. 336) and Program Authorisation recognise refusals where a reasonable excuse exists. Mine included livestock safety and my on-farm Biosecurity Plan.
⚖️ 5. Is the Program even valid in 2025?
The Fire Ant Program Authorisation was signed in 2016 and never reviewed. It contains no sunset clause, yet biosecurity science and national strategies have advanced dramatically since then. Using a 2016 instrument in 2025 raises serious questions of validity (Project Blue Sky; Coco v The Queen).
⚖️ 6. Human Rights?
The Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) requires respect for privacy and home. No such consideration was given.
👉 Bottom line: The law requires strict compliance before coercive powers can be used against individuals. If the Biosecurity action was unlawful, police action under s. 790 cannot stand.
Question: Do you think the 2016 Fire Ant Program and the police action taken under it are still lawful in 2025?
#Biosecurity #Law #Queensland #CivilRights #FireAntProgram
After posting https://aagpilot.com/2025/09/26/criminal-charge-defense/ yesterday I had people reach out adding to the strength of my argument.
I wonder if Police realise the potential civil litigation, or even criminal prosecution, that may occur should this argument proove successful. I make this public in hope they will stop empowering Biosecurity Queensland and the NFAEP to contravene peoples fundamental human rights, private property rights and individual choice to toxic chemcial exposure.
Legal Argument with Authorities
1. Statutory interpretation principles
- Statutes that confer coercive powers (like forced entry or chemical treatment) are interpreted strictly.
- High Court authority:
- Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427 – coercive powers must be clearly authorised by Parliament. Ambiguities are resolved in favour of the individual.
- Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476 – an action outside statutory authority is jurisdictional error and invalid.
Application: The Biosecurity Act does not expressly authorise entry for “preventative” purposes where no biosecurity matter is present. Therefore, any attempt to stretch the Act that way is invalid.
2. Ultra vires principle
- Administrative decisions/programs must be made within the scope of statutory authority.
- Project Blue Sky Inc v ABA (1998) 194 CLR 355 – if a program or action is inconsistent with the statute, it is invalid to the extent of inconsistency.
- Minister for Immigration v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 – exercise of power must be reasonable and rationally connected to the statutory purpose.
Application: A prevention and control program that authorises entry without ants on the property is inconsistent with the definition of “biosecurity risk” (s. 16) and is therefore ultra vires.
3. Requirement of a material basis for power
- The Act requires the presence of biosecurity matter or an activity involving it.
- Without that, there is no jurisdictional fact grounding the exercise of power.
- Enfield City Corp v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135 – where the existence of a jurisdictional fact is required, the court can review whether it exists.
Application: The jurisdictional fact here is the presence of “biosecurity matter.” The government admits preventative treatment occurs even where no ants are present, so the jurisdictional fact is absent.
4. Proportionality and necessity
- Coercive measures must be proportionate to the statutory objective.
- South Australia v Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1 – limits on individual rights must be justified by a clear and proportionate connection to statutory purpose.
Application: Forced chemical treatment and entry in the absence of ants is disproportionate. There is no actual biosecurity risk justifying interference with property rights.
5. Consequences for enforcement
- A person cannot be guilty of obstruction if the officers’ actions were unlawful.
- Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), s. 790(2) – the offence requires the officer to be acting lawfully.
- Coco v The Queen again supports that strict compliance with authorising statutes is required before coercive powers can be exercised.
Application: If officers exceeded their authority under the Biosecurity Act, they were not “acting lawfully,” and obstruction cannot be made out. This is a reasonable excuse.
6. Summary
Therefore, officers were acting unlawfully, and non-compliance was excused.
The Biosecurity Act defines “biosecurity risk” as requiring “biosecurity matter.”
Preventative treatment in the absence of ants is not authorised by the Act.
The Program cannot enlarge powers — Project Blue Sky.
Entry without a biosecurity matter present is beyond jurisdiction — Enfield.
Coercive powers must be clearly authorised and proportionate — Coco, Totani.
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