Fire ant incursions into Australia have repeatedly been linked to the Port of Brisbane, including the original documented introduction. International shipping continues without major disruption. Containers move daily, commercial freight flows as normal, and manufactured goods—including bricks—continue crossing borders with minimal restriction, despite being recognised pathways in multiple incursions.
Yet on the other side of this system, hay producers—who have over 24 years of clean, compliant interstate trade—now face heavy regulation, market restrictions, and increased compliance costs. If the most high-volume industrial pathways remain open, why are small agricultural producers being treated as the primary threat?
This imbalance isn’t just inconvenient—it’s economically unjust.
Government Admits Harm, But Offers No Compensation
NSW Biosecurity acknowledges that movement restrictions “may present short-term economic challenges for producers.”
If the government concedes that its policies cause financial harm, will compensation be provided to:
- growers
- transport operators
- rural supply and service businesses?
Shared responsibility must include shared financial burden—not shifting costs onto those least able to absorb them.
Government Assertions vs. Lived Experience
The letter, signed by Lisa Szabo, Executive Director of Biosecurity and Food Safety (NSW Department of Primary Industries and Regional Development), states that “scientific evidence, including necropsy and laboratory testing, does not support claims of harm to wildlife, pets, or livestock from fire ant treatments.”
I do not accept this position.
It is directly at odds with the lived experience of affected landholders and inconsistent with a growing body of scientific research raising concerns regarding:
- environmental persistence of chemicals
- toxicity pathways
- long-term ecological impacts
- cumulative exposure
- bioaccumulation in soil and water systems
A claim that “no scientific evidence exists” does not resolve the issue—it simply avoids acknowledging evidence that has not yet been tested through independent judicial scrutiny.
Government departments are not judicial authorities. Only a court can determine whether evidence is sufficient to establish harm. The absence of court-tested evidence does not mean harm does not exist—it means the evidence has not been allowed to enter a judicial forum.
If the program is confident in its safety claims, that evidence should be tested publicly and independently—not asserted administratively by the same agency that procures and applies the chemicals.
Billions in Public Funds, Minimal Transparency
While ordinary landholders face compliance costs, billions in taxpayer funding flow into:
- cabinet-in-confidence chemical contracts
- international suppliers
- foreign research partnerships
- private corporate agreements
…with little public transparency on environmental outcomes, product safety, or program efficacy.
The public shoulders the risk. Corporations collect the revenue. Producers bear the regulatory burden.
This is not shared responsibility—it is selective enforcement.
Biosecurity Must Be Fair, Lawful, and Evidence-Based
Fire ants are a real threat. Effective biosecurity is necessary. But policy must be:
âś” proportionate
âś” scientifically accountable
âś” economically fair
âś” subject to judicial review
âś” applied evenly across industries
At present, regulation appears designed to preserve major commercial trade pathways while imposing disproportionate burdens on rural producers who have demonstrated compliance for decades.
Shared responsibility must mean shared accountability—not a system where those with the least political influence carry the cost for those with the most to gain.
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